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2025: The Year of Turkey and Erdoğan

Turkish companies are increasingly exporting to Africa, and more and more infrastructure is being renovated to accommodate these new products.

Soldecanarias.net / Adeje

According to the Chinese calendar, 2025 will be the year of the wooden snake. However, we can truly say that 2025 will be the year of Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The fall of Damascus to the Syrian opposition has resulted in Turkey’s regional influence growing, but not only that—there are different situations that allow us to affirm that 2025 will be a year in which we must look at Turkey for various reasons. From its influence in the Balkans, its agreements with Gulf monarchies, to its role in North Africa. Even with Spain, cooperation with Turkey will be key, and in the development of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, its intrinsic support for President Volodymyr Zelensky.

First of all, it will be necessary to closely examine what affects us most as Europeans, and for this reason, we must focus on the Balkans. Through different economic, cultural, and military cooperation agreements, the Turkish Republic is one of the main actors in the Balkans. All the countries located below the Danube—formerly the border of the Ottoman Empire for centuries—have strong ties with Turkey, especially the Muslim triad, formed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania. Then comes its key influence in Montenegro, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Romania, and, although it may not seem so, Hungary is also fundamental. Let us remember that Hungary is part of the Organization of Turkic States.

Turkey’s influence in all these states has a direct effect on EU foreign policy. The EU is a preferred actor in the foreign relations of all these countries. There has been normalization and good neighborly relations with Greece for a couple of years now, and even more so after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

This is another important aspect—Turkey’s role in supporting Ukraine has been fundamental in establishing its position as an impartial mediator. On the one hand, it has always been critical of sanctions against Russia, as there are significant economic exchanges between Russia and Turkey, although now we will see what happens after the downing of the AZAL flight (Azerbaijan’s national airline) by Russia. On the other hand, Turkey has always been critical and has condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the violation of the rights of the Tatars, a Turkic people.

Turkey, along with China, is economically expanding throughout the Russian economic space, which was left empty due to sanctions. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan have distanced themselves from Russia and moved closer to Turkey even more. This has greatly facilitated the gradual signing of energy and trade agreements between these countries and the European Union. The EU sanctions on Russia have positioned all these republics as economic partners for their energy production. In some cases, they have been helping Russia evade sanctions and have taken advantage of this by doing business.

After the Balkans and Europe, the fall of Damascus marks a turning point. It is no coincidence that the first mission to open after the entry of Islamist militias was Turkey’s. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Qatar and Turkey have supported the opposition in Syria, and after fourteen years, their bet has paid off. Turkish Airlines, Turkey’s state-owned airline, will operate the first international flights landing in Damascus and Aleppo. And it will be Turkish railway engineers who will rebuild Syria’s railway network.

As has been announced, there is interest and willingness to rebuild the historic Ottoman line that connected Istanbul with Hejaz (Saudi Arabia), but this time it will reach Damascus. A note for movie lovers: this is the line that the Arabs blew up in Lawrence of Arabia.

The fall of Damascus and the establishment of an interim Syrian government whose main allies are Turkish and Qatari also outline a new energy scenario. On the table, as reported by Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar, is the establishment of a new energy connection between Turkey and Qatar, through Saudi Arabia and Syria. This new connection was suspended due to the Arab Spring. In this way, the EU would reduce its energy dependence on Russia and the United States.

Poland was one of the first countries to strengthen ties between Qatar and the European Union. To avoid dependence on Russian energy, since the annexation of Crimea, the Polish company Orlen has been working with Saudis and Qataris. This once again places Turkey in a central role as a bridge between the Gulf and the EU. Let us remember that the India-EU trade connection, through Iraq and Turkey, established as a viable project at the G20 summit in Delhi in 2023, is also on the table.

And finally, Turkey’s role in the Mediterranean and Africa. Its diplomatic role in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea, as well as in Sudan, stands out. In this way, Turkey also appears there as a counterweight to China’s growing influence. Turkish companies are increasingly exporting to Africa, and more and more infrastructure is being renovated to accommodate these new products.

African leaders do not want photos with Putin, nor do they want Wagner at their borders. They create problems, a bad external image, and are a problematic focus now that popularity is at an all-time low. In contrast, Turkey and Sadat (a Turkish private military company) appear, providing support and training for African governments. Turkey’s neutrality and its non-interference in national affairs are also advantages, even for gaining space in both Morocco and Algeria simultaneously, or for supporting Tripoli while closing agreements with Egypt, a country that supports the opposing Libyan faction.

Thus, Erdoğan’s Turkey in 2025 will gain weight in the Balkans, and therefore within the European Union and NATO. Its relevance in the Levant will also be greater, achieving one of the goals of neo-Ottoman policy—extending its influence from Damascus to the South Caucasus, and from Iraq to Hungary. And in between, the African and Mediterranean issue, where it is the only state that can have an unrivaled maritime policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. We will see what happens with the Cypriot issue, as it is expected that Northern Cyprus will be recognized.

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